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SAVIGNY: GERMAN LAWGIVER
[Liaw . . . is first developed by custom and popularfaith,
next by judicial decisions-everywhere, therefore, by internal,
silently operatingpowers, not by the arbitrarywill of a law-giver.

-F.

K. von Savigny

I. INTRODUCTION
The great German jurist, Friedrick Karl von Savigny, stands
as the undisputed head of the influential historial school of jurisprudence, which he pioneered in the first half of the 19th century,
and as the founder of the study of relations between social and legal
developments) A trail-blazing legal scientist, Savigny made many
lasting contributions to jurisprudence that greatly influenced all
the social disciplines as well. Among these contributions are included the revealing of continuity between present legal institutions
and those of the past, 2 the laying of foundations for legal sociology, 3 and the articulating of methods for historical research.' In
light of the work of Savigny, it is thus the intent of this paper to
present a full, in-depth profile of this legal scholar and his influence
on the law in society.
II. EARLY LIFE AND WORK
Savigny was born of French Protestant stock at Frankfurt-amMain on February 21, 1779.1 Orphaned at 13, he came under the
guardianship of M. de Neurath, who dominated his early education. Neurath, a lawyer and imperial official, employed the stereotyped, catechistic method to emerse his ward into the study of the
natural law of Wolff and Vattel, international law, and Roman and
German law. Undoubtedly as a result of this tutelage, Savigny
was eager to commence studies at the University of Marburg and
at G6ttingen. It was there that he not only received an orthodox
1. J. STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW 421-22 (1946) [hereinafter cited
as FUNCTION OF LAW].
2. Montmorency, Friedrich Carl von Savigny, in GREAT JURISTS OF THE WORLD 57374 (J. Macdonell & E. Manson ed. 1914) [hereinafter cited as GREAT JURISTS].
3. J. STONE, SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF LAW AND JUSTICE 35-36 (1966) [hereinafter cited
as SOCIAL. DIMENSIONS].

4. Id. at 100-01.
5. GREAT JURISTS at 561.
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education but, also, got a taste of the new stirrings of historicism.
His early teaching and writing would later be of a similar mix.6
In 1800, Savigny became a doctor of law at Marburg and, as
such, one of the first of the German nobility to teach at a university. Subsequently, he taught criminal law, Roman law and its
history, property law and the law of contracts at Marburg and
Landshut.7 In 1810, he became a professor at the newly formed
University of Berlin, where he spent most of his academic career
until 1842.8 The qualities Savigny possessed as a scholar were
joined with those of an enthusiastic teacher. To Savigny, it was for
the professor to personify science to the student by transmitting the
knowledge gathered "as if science revealed itself suddenly to him."
He noted further of his students that "it is not merely instruction
which they receive, but a process which goes on beneath the eye
and which they themselves reproduce."' During his tenure, Savigny
also gained practical judicial and administrative experience
through his rendering of such services as judge on the law faculty,
advisor to the ordinary courts, and counsellor of the Court of
Appeal and Tax at Berlin. 0
Savigny's book on the right of possession, Das Recht des
Besitzes, appeared in 1803.11 The work clearly showed sociological
implications, for it represented an early classic, expounding on the
study of the Roman system of law as produced by the ancient
Roman civilization.' 2 The metaphysical version of the Roman
theory of occupation was said to have provided a linkage between
the 18th century and Savigny's pronouncement that all property
was founded in adverse possession ripened by prescription. 13 He
wrote, in fact, pounds of pages on possession when the German law
was pervaded with broad premises-often half-mystical-which
were rigorously followed (all'in contrast to American empiricism,
with its case-by-case approach)." Shortly after Recht des Besitzes
6. Id. at 562-63.
7. Id. at 563.
8. Id. at 572.
9. SOCIAL DIMENSIONS at 87.

10. Id.
11. GREAT JURISTS at 568. Austin declared this work to be "of all books upon law, the
most consummate and masterly." J. AUSTIN, PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED

38 (3d. 1832).
12. FUNCTION OF LAW at 428.
13. R. POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 213 (1922).

14. K. LEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE 177 (1962).

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

was published, Savigny turned his attention toward the historical
and jurisprudential interests that would dominate the rest of his
career.

III.

DEBATE OVER CODIFICATION-THE BEGINNINGS OF THE
HISTORICAL SCHOOL

The event which immediately occasioned Savigny to direct his
interests in the area of historical jurisprudence was the publication
of another work, Civilistesche Abhandlungen, in 1814.15 Germany
being without a unified civil code at this time, Anton F.L. Thibaut,
a professor of Roman law at Heidelberg, wrote the aforementioned
book to demand that a general civil code be adopted for the nation. 16 Under his plan, Professor Thibaut proposed that a single,
unified code of laws for the German states be drafted by an interstate committee on the laws. Indulging in natural law, Thibaut
assumed that such a committee of jurists and practitioners would
be able to draw up a suitable code, and, further, dogmatically
asserted that codification could revolutionize a legal system
17
overnight.
This proposal had been published by Thibaut after the Napoleonic wars, while the Congress of Vienna was deciding the fate of
Europe in general, and Germany in particular; 8 given these circumstances, the book naturally revealed both the stirrings of the
new nationalism that was then on the rise in Germany and the
growing reaction against Roman or any other foreign law. The
French occupation of Germany had greatly solidified a sense of
unity among the many existing German states, and, following the
defeat of Napoleon, the codes he had forced upon them were discarded because they were considered to be alien.19 Clearly the new
nationalist idea rejected adoption of the French code for Germany; 0 the very lack of analogy to the French situation was used
as an aid in the call for a German code." Likewise, Roman law,
which was taught at the universities and had dominated German
legal administration and adjudication, was also condemned by the
15. SOCIAL DIMENSIONS at 94.
16. W. SEAGLE, THE HISTORY OF THE LAW 290-91 (1946) [hereinafter cited as SEAGLE].
17. FUNCTION OF LAW at 430.
18. SOCIAL DIMENSIONS at 94.
19. FUNCTION OF LAW at 424.

20. Id. at 428.
21. S. AMos, A

SYSTEMATIC VIEW OF THE SCIENCE OF JURISPRUDENCE

384-85 (1876).
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nationalists as an "alien law." How could a system of laws created
by the ancient Romans for their needs between the 5th century
B.C. and the 6th century A.D. be applicable to the needs of the
German people in the 19th century? Hence, it was proposed that
the "alien law" be replaced by a system of law indigenous to
22
Germany.
Against such a backdrop, it seems understandable that Savigny, along with his followers, would necessarily enter into this
legal field, having been moved to speculate on the central thesis of
the law and its relation to the social context. By so doing, they gave
the field its first modern juristic theories.23
Of course, the founding of the historical school, which identified law with custom, as championed by Savigny, developed out of
the codification controversy. 24 In vigorously opposing codification
in his monograph, Vom Beruf unsrer Zeit fur Gesetzgebung und
Rechtswissenschaft, which he wrote in response to Thibaut's
work,2 5 Savigny provided impetus for the emerging historical
theory of law. Underlying this ceply to Thibaut was a basic hypothesis of later sociological jurisprudence: that law was to be understood as an aspect of social life. To Savigny, law was a part of the
complex of a people's experience and character. Thus, he countered the natural right assumptions of Thibaut by maintaining that
the law was not a self-contained phenomena of collected verbal
formulae in some universal body of ideal or "natural" propositions.26 To assume that law was "universal," as the natural-law
philosophers had, would, in Savigny's mind, be fallacious and illusionary.27 Thus, in opposing codification, Savigny's historical jurisprudence also attacked the philosophy of natural law.2
It was to be expected that Savigny would react-and react
quickly-to those tenets of natural law he had found to be repugnant. As a young lad he had been rigorously subjected to the study
of natural law by his tutor. Later, being directly influenced at
G ttingen by Professor Hugo, whose book on Roman legal history
was published in 1790, Savigny asserted that the peculiar relation22. FUNCTION OF LAW at 424.

23. Id. at 429-30.
24. SEAGLE at 23, 290-91.
25. SOCIAL DIMENSIONS at 94.
26. FUNCTION OF LAW at 430-31.
27. SOCIAL DIMENSIONS at 95.

28. Id. at 88-89.
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ship between the law and the life of each particular society undermined natural law from the viewpoint of history and human experience. Thus, he.challenged the natural law idea of a universal code
because he thought, evidencing Hugo's influence, that the law
should reflect the unique needs and character of the people of each
nation. -9 Here, then, Savigny was able to masterfully turn around
the previously cited argument for codification by utilizing it instead
as an objection to a general code for all Germany on the grounds
that such a code would be a reckless importation and an imitation
of Napoleon's work in France and the other countries he
subdued."
In repudiating the 18th century doctrine of natural rights and
the law of nature 31-that which was truly to be honored in the
legal field 32-Savigny's school of thought substituted in its place
the notion of historical right: any individual exultation of natural
order would set that order in opposition to history, placing the
creations of history under constant threat of either violent or gradual destruction.?
To the historical school, the law existed independent of the
state; it was the creation, not of nature or nature's God, but of the
naiional consciousness. The rule of law was, thus, mysteriously
begotten of this "spirit of the people" (or Volksgeist) in whom it
had already existed.34 Therefore, since law originated in the
Volksgeist
unique spirit of the people it could not be made, and3the
5
became the basis for study in all its manifestations.
Savigny's Volksgeist doctrine, the first to recognize each particular nation as having a continuity and uniqueness of experience
all its own, was a juristic expression of the romantic revival which
had an influence on Savigny, himself. 6 Indeed, the whole perspective of historical jurisprudence was a part of the romantic movement which had begun in the latter period of the 18th century. In
Germany it took the form of a movement back to the simplest
tribal origins of the Germanic people, their folk songs and tales,
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

FUNCTION OF LAW at 423.
S. AMos, supra note 21, at 385.

C.

HAINES, REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS

69 (1965).

K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 14, at 480.
Y. SIMON, THE TRADITION OF NATURAL LAW 38 (1965).
H. KELSON, WHAT IS JUSTICE? 299 (1957).
SOCIAL DIMENSIONS at 95.
FUNCTION OF LAW at 424.
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and their distinctive national spirit. It was in Grimm's fairy tales,
the Roman history of Barthold Niebuhr, and the philosophy of
Johann Gottfried von Herder that the movement found expression;
and, in association with such minds as Niebuhr, during his professorship at Berlin, Savigny had molded his own views for this later
movement."
In Vom Beruf unsrer Zeit Savigny emphasized the historicorganic growth of the law and its courts through the common,
popular, ethical, legal consciousness prevailing among the people. 8 Since the historical school insisted upon thorough research
into legal origins and transformations, Savigny believed that law
had its own history and followed its own stages of growth. 9 He
was led to theorize that the law was a changing, evolving
whole-although it was there as a whole just the same." (On this
point, Karl Llewellyn compared Savigny with Bentham and other
older writers in that he seemed "sometimes to have written as if
work in jurisprudence had no point unless it could at the moment
of its doing be brought into its right relation with a whole and
rounded view of all of law and all of law's work.") 4 To Savigny,2
the integral history of law was the history of the legal profession.
What was said to be true of the law was also true of the history of
the law.43
At the earliest level of its development, the law was expressed
spontaneously as an unfolding of ideas of right based upon customary habits and traditions to which people gave their obeisance.
That the only true source of all law came directly from custom, as
Savigny contended,44 was evidence of its existence." The law,
evolving only from the spirit of the people,46 was seen as being slow,
almost imperceptible in its growth: the product of dark, anonymous forces (those "internal, silently operating powers")" and not
37. Id. at 420.
38. A. Ross, ON LAW AND JUSTICE 345 (1959).
39. READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE 87 (J. HALL ed. 1938).
40. J. SHKLAR, LEGALISM 137-38 (1964).
41. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 14, at 154.
42. J. SHKLAR, supra note 40.
43. FUNCTION OF LAW at 421.

44. SEAGLE at 290.
45. A. Ross, supra note 38.
46. SEAGLE at 291.
47. FUNCTION OF LAW at 431.
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the creation of deliberate and arbitrary decisions. 8 This evolutionary product resulted in rights which did not belong to man, as such.
Demonstrating his high regard for the past of his own people,
Savigny summarized this theory as follows:
The motley world of legal forms. . does not evolve in virtue
of deliberate natural reflection or reasoned considerations of utility, it springs rather from the common conviction of the people,
from the like feeling of inner necessity which excludes all thought
of fortuitous and arbitrary origin.4
While Savigny stressed the deep origins of law in social attitudes and ways of life, he noted that as a people's life became more
specialized and artificial, the law, too, became "more artificial and
complex." Where the law had "formerly . . .existed in the consciousness of the community," as it matured it develved upon the
jurists, who, in this department, represented the community." This
special class, the legal profession, was entrusted with the duty of
interpreting and elaborating the ethical-legal consciousness of the
people. In taking the place of custom, the academic study of law,
thus, became the most important form of revealing the law 51-as
interpreted by the judges in formal decisions. 52 Despite this development, however, Savigny recognized that part of the law (especially for young peoples) remained related to the popular consciousness and way of life, still simple in concept; this part he
termed, "the political element." That which was artificially elaborated by juristic activity he called, "the technical element." 5
It was in light of all he had said on the nature of the law that
Savigny considered codification, which he defined as a special kind
of legislation involving both the reduction of a people's whole stock
of law to writing impressed with the exclusive stamp of state authority, and the death of all other pre-code sources of law. Each
,nation, he felt, must decide for itself whether the proper time for
codification of its laws had arrived. 54 Perhaps expressing a reactionary sentiment in the wake of the Congress of Vienna, Savigny
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

H. KELSoCN, supra note 34, at 299.
H. ROMMEN, THE NATURAL LAW 116 (T. Hanley transl. 1959).
FUNCTION OF LAW at 430-31.
A. Ross, supra note 38.
SEAGLE at 291.

53. FUNCTION OF LAW at 431.

54. S. AMOS, supra note 21, at 385.
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had decided that the time was not ripe in Germany for such legislative reform. 5

First, he specifically condemned plans for codification on the
ground that the "state of the public mind" of the German people
was "deficient" in "the law-making faculty" because it lacked the
legal consciousness upon which to base the new legislative formulation. 6 While use of the power of the state could very well cut off
extra-code developments, 57 the state's function was merely to discover and enforce customary law. No amount of state authority
could produce a real, suitable, or stable code if the political element were not mature. That the state of the German Volksgeist,
whose lives the code would govern, had not yet fulfilled this "political" prerequisite was clearly emphasized by Savigny, who further
added that to ignore these limitations in attempting "to establish
an exhaustive system of legislation" would only mean that the code
would
inevitably attract all attention to itself, away from the real source
of the law, so that the latter, left in darkness and obscurity,
[would] derive no assistance from the moral energies of the nation, by which alone it [could] attain a satisfactory state.58
Legislation and codes could, at best, only give verbal expression
to existing law. Opposed to "armchair legislation," Savigny favored the idea of continuity of experience, the mastery of which
was wholly essential for any progress. This belief that conditions
of time and place limited effective legal action stood as a forerunner of socio-psychological doctrine. 9
Secondly, Savigny believed that a code could not be drafted if
the juristic maturity of the "technical element" were not available
to perform the task: what matter if even the political element were
adequate for codification when jurists of sufficient genius, wellversed in the tradition and spirit of the law, were lacking. Codificatidn presupposed a highly developed study of law so that the code
could be an adequate interpretation of the living law. This "technical" expertise Savigny believed his contemporaries lacked. 0 In
55.

SEAGLE

at 291.

56. SOCiAL DIMENSIONS at 96-98.
57. FUNCTION OF LAw at 432.

58. Id.
59. Id. at 423, 433.
60. A. Ross, supra note 38.
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denying any such competence to so legislate,"' Savigny, while noting gigns of rising juristic talents, found none equal to achieving
the task at hand. To Savigny, the framers of a civil code were only
dilettantes.12 He pointed out that Thibaut, in his codification proposal, ignored this "technical" inadequacy of the age (as he had
the deficiency in the "political" prerequisite). Unlike the proponents of codification who proposed it as a remedy for the legal
deficiency in the state of the sources, Savigny found the deficiency
"in ourselves, and [I] believe for this very reason that we are not
qualified to form a code.""
He urged judges to master the materials of existing mixed
Roman and German law not yet assimilated-that "immense mass
of juridical notions and theories which have descended and been
multiplied through generations." 4 Once these materials were mastered, faith in the supposed dictates of "pure" reason carried over
from the natural law of the 18th century could then be subjected
to the vital test of experience. 5
Indispensable to the jurist, continued Savigny, was (1) the historical spirit, "to seize with readiness the peculiarities of every age
and every form of law," and (2) the systematic spirit, "to view
every notion and every rule in lively connection and co-operation
with the whole, that is, the only true and natural relation." 6 As a
gardener looks after the growth of a plant, the natural development
of the law could be furthered with the support of academic studies,
rather than by legislative interference which misconstrued the mission in a vain attempt fated to be crushed by the forces of development. Therefore, any codification claiming to be final would be in
conflict with the organic growth of the law." While codification
was always harmful, the best conditions for its success were to be
found in the "middle period development"-at the height of a
people's development, when the civilization and knowledge of the
age surpassed that of all preceding ages. Such an undertaking at
any other time would only mutilate the products of the past. Only
at the right time, in the right place, could the right code be pro-

61. H. KELSON, supra note 34.
62. SEAGLE at 291.
63. FUNCTION OF LAw at 433-34.
64. Id. at 433.

65. Id.
66. Id?
67. A. Ross, supra note 38, at 345.
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duced. A code drafted in this middle period would aid not that age,
itself, where it was not needed, but future declining ages when
"almost everything is wanting, the knowledge of the matter as well
as the language."6 Hence, codification could only be justified for
periods of cultural deterioration.69
Moreover, ripe though the materials of the law might become,
still needed were technical juristic knowledge, superb skill, and that
degree of precision appropriate to the subject matter to be codified.
This could be done only by extracting concepts and principles,
defining .them, and tracing their consequences and interrelations-a process which Savigny referred to as being one of the
most difficult in the area of jurisprudence. He felt that Thibaut's
.proposal of codification without such skills would, if adopted, result in contradictions, ambiguities, omissions, and confusion. This
would do grave harm because a bad code would insulate law from
its sources of popular consciousness. As a case in point, Savigny
cited, in Vom Beruf, the decay of juristic study in the German
states of Austria and Prussia, as well as in France. 0
Savigny's Vom BerufunsrerZeit directly influenced the course
of a country's legal development perhaps as no other single, comparable essay had. As was the author's intent, it delayed German
codification for more than half a century. Under the work of historical jurists, older concepts of natural law and rights were replaced by legal ideas as an outgrowth of history. Germany became
distinguished for its great legal historians, as jurists soon turned
their attentions from "living law" to the law of the ancient Romans
and the German peoples. Not until 1896 did Germany adopt the
Code Civil, which became effective on January 1, 1900.7
One legal scholar has suggested that "Savigny might have
spared himself the trouble.of replying to Thibaut" because "[tihe
creation of a unified national law was then a political impossibility,
f6r there were no legislative organs in the German confederation
capable of accomplishing the task. '7 2 But this statement only
seems to buttress what Savigny said in opposing codification in the
first place. The same scholar also found it ironic that two decades
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

FUNCTION OF LAW at 433, 435.
A. Ross, supra note 38, at 345.
FuNCTION OF LAW at 434, 436.
SEAGLE at 290-91.
Id. at 291.
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later it was Savigny who was entrusted with the work of codification and that nothing came of the project. 73 However, it would be
doing Savigny an injustice here to assert that he simply opposed
any codification or legislation, 74 for he only opposed codification
for the Germany of his time. Indeed, he was not content with
merely negating 6odification in his Beruf, but even went so far as
his own program for legal development in the German
to set down
75
states .
Savigny's constructive proposals for the development of the
German law involved the mastery of three sets of legal materials.
The first was the original Roman law, which was to serve as an
historical base and a model of refined techniques upon which the
jurists could build. Savigny emphasized the importance here of
"the confirmed habit of viewing every notion and every doctrine
in its proper historical light." The second, taking into account
continuity of experience, was the material of the less cultivated
Germanic law, as it was intimately related to the German people.
Finally, he included a modification of these two primary systems
of Roman and local law, believing that jurists should purge all
those materials 'produced through the mere ignorance and dullness of uncultivated times without any real practical demand for
it." Savigny was convinced that once his program was executed,
the burden of German legal heritage could then-and only
then-be turned to a national advantage, resulting in acquisition
of a vigorous7 legal system, not "merely a feeble imitation" of the
Roman law. 1
Then, too, may future degenerate times be provided for and then
will be the time for considering whether this will be done best by
codes or in another form .
Although he might have doubted whether a code would ever be
desirable from a practical standpoint, Savigny always held out
hope for some future codification, his later works extending the
program he outlined in Vom BerufunsrerZeit. These works helped
73. Id.
74. For a discussimn of the question as to whether Savigny did deny the efficacy of
conscious creative legislation in general, see SOCIAL DIMENSIONS at 98-99.
75. FUNCTION OF LAW at 435-36.
76. Id. at 435-37.

77. Id. at 437.
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make the codification in Germany at the turn of the century a
success.7"
IV.

SAVIGNY AS A ROMANIST

It seems paradoxical for Savigny both to have emphasized the
intimate bond between the whole social development of a people
and their law and, at the same time, to have espoused the retention
of Roman law as the law of the state, over and against the development of German law. To those who sought to rid the German state
of "alien" law in the spirit of nationalism, the second line of Sa-

vigny's thought flew in the face of his Volksgeist theory, which was
turned against him. 79 According to Vaughan Hawkins in the
JuridicalSociety Papers, Savigny was said to have preferred the
Roman law because it was "neither too plain nor too obscure, but
expressed in a sort of middling obscurity-'auf einem schmalen
Raume mittelmdssiger Dunkelheit.' ,8
In 1815, the same year in which he, together with Karl Friedrich Eichhorn and Johann Friedrich Ludwig Goschen, founded the
organ for the new historical school, Zeitschrift far geschichtlicke
Rechtswissenschaft, Savigny published the first volume of his treatise on medieval Roman law, Geschichte des r6mischen Rechts in
Mittelalter. The sixth and last volume of this treatise did not appear until 1831, the delay having been caused by the author's illhealth. 8' Addressing himself to the issue of whether the Roman law
as received into Germany had been transformed to meet German
needs, Savigny intended in this work, to trace the development
from its ancient origin to its adoption in modern Europe. Thus,
there can be seen in Geschichte a linkage with the program in Vom
Beruf. In Geschichte, Savigny sought to prove that the rules of the
adapted Roman law could be traced "to their historical roots" by
uncovering the history of Roman law during the least-known period of Roman legal development. In the process, Savigny also
showed that juristic activity was a highly important component of
legal history and that a close interrelationship existed between the
legal and the general history of the respective peoples.12 Savigny
78. Id. at 436-38..
79. Id. at 422-24.
80. C. CURTIS, IT'S YOUR LAW 61 (1954).
81. FUNCTION OF LAw at 437.
82. Id. at 428.
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introduced his opus in the following words:
In analysing the practice of modern law we see that the
greater part of the principles or notions which compose it are of
Roman origin. But these notions and these principles did not fall
upon us from the sky; they reached us through a continuous
tradition of six centuries of profound ignorance and seven other
centuries of profound literary activity more or less good. The
centuries of the regenerated activity, in transmitting Roman law,
have not failed to modify it exceedingly ...

It is impossible to ignore what the intermediate centuries
have added to the original Roman law for all that we learn from
our professors and our books is imbued with it. We sail this sea
and it would be a dangerous illusion to wish to abstract the
element upon which we are. . . . [W]e must turn this formless

mass of legal authorities into an organized body. Thus one will
succeed in distinguishing the good from the bad, the original
from the borrowed, so that one discovers the ramifications and
geneology of ideas, the creative life of the spirit in a region which
at first only inspires confusion and distaste."

Savigny had delved into the wealth of material left behind by
the scholar Ceyus, whose commentary on the Corpus Juris of Jus84
tinian during the Renaissance proved to be most enlightening.
During this 12th century revival of Roman law, there were compiled all the provisions enacted by Justinian under his great Corpus
Juris, which had maintained its force through medieval Europe. 8
To be sure, through his investigatory work, it was Savigny who
proved beyond question in Geschichte that the books of the Corpus
Juris, since promulgated, had been known and continued to be in
use in Italy during the Middle Ages. 8
In review, Geschichte "was an impressive addition to existing
knowledge" and inspired other works. It "fell short," however, of
the author's purpose. Savigny tended to concentrate more on the
historical continuity of legal doctrine than on the relationship between doctrine and social conditions existent just prior to the revival.817 In this vein, Marx criticized Savigny as having become so
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 437-38.
J. ZANE, THE STORY OF THE LAW 218 (1927).
FUNCTION-OF LAW at 425-26.
J. HADLEY, INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 33 (1890).
FUNCTION OF LAW at 437.
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engrossed in the source of the law that he forgot all about its
stream."8

After his history was completed, Savigny's next venture was
that of authoring a more elaborate treatise on the system of modern Roman law, System des heutigen romischen Rechts. This work
contained Savigny's theory of private international law and his
further study on possession and error.89 It was not, however, a text
on Roman law per se, for System only dealt with those parts of
the law which had been adapted to German life and modified by
German institutions. This being the case, Roman Criminal law and
all law not compiled before Justinian were, of course, excluded
because they had not been so "naturalized." 9 Given Savigny's lifelong preoccupation with the adaptation of Roman law to modern
conditions, he wished to discuss in hhese volumes how the Roman
law had taken root and grown in the soil of modern European
society." In sum, hherefore, this work represented an exposition on
that which Savigny had made his life's work: development of a
Roman Gemeinesrecht for Germany. Not without profound influence, the treatise was regarded as "a masterpiece of analytical
jurisprudence of a particular system." More importantly, System
was part of Savigny's program for bringing the law of modern
Germany into a better form through mastery of the legal materials
he had found to be wanting.
V.

OTHER LATER WORKS AND LEGACY

Savigny was appointed chancellor of Prussia in 1842 by
Fredrich William IV; in this capacity he carried out several important reforms, incpuding those relative to bills of exchange and divorce. He retired in 1848, and later died at Berlin in 1861. in the
interim, a collection of his minor works, Vermischte Schriften,
were published in 1850.92
An assessment of Savigny's work demonstrates how his historical school pioneered the study of law in society. To be sure, in any
significant history of legal change over a given period, the mutually
dependent legal and social developments have come to be taken
88. SEAGLE at 377.
89. This work on modern Roman law was later supplemented by another two-volume
work entitled, DAS OBLIGATIONENRECHT (1851-53).
90. FUNCTION OF LAW at 438.
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into account; and, in applying scientific methods to human relations, it has been found much easier to begin with the materials of
past civilizations. When the techniques of investigation and interpretation have been developed from a study of the past, man's
subjective attitude toward contemporary data can be overcome.93
Savigny opened up the entire field of inquiry into law and lawmaking as a social phenomenon in his juristic doctrine of continuity of development from the people's Geist to the legal specialists.
There was, in his stress on continuity, a pre-Darwinian
evolutionism."
Savigny's conception of common social experience, with the
law emanating from the Volksgeist, resulted, in one case, in the
beliefs expressed in Hegelian philosophy, which elevated the
Volksgeist concept into an absolute idea of a world spirit unfolding
in human history. Out of this fallacy of the Volksgeist in the Hegelian state came a compounded 20th century perversion witnessed
by the "race doctrine" of fascist and nazi ideologies, inherent in
the leadership principle under the National Socialist nation. Remarkably successful in consciously directing group attitudes and
ways toward evil, the Nazi dictatorship rose as a natural development from the German juristic character that might makes right.9
Although the Nazis glorified the German Volk for their own ends,
surely Savigny, himself, would have thoroughly disapproved of the
racist interpretations.
Even those, however, who tended to exaggerate that unscientific element in the historical philosophy had to admit that under
Savigny's doctrine the Volk were regarded as an ultimate reality,
a mystical soul-or even a biological conception. The law which
emanated from it was to be watched for and discovered, rather
than tampered with by mere human legislators.
Of other contributions to social thought, Savigny accorded
early juristic recognition to the relativity and dependence of the
nature of law and ideas of the just as but one manifestation of
social life, for he showed that while the law seeks to control men,
it is a product of living men in a particular time, place, and society
-only in relation to which experience can the law be operative
93. FUNCTION OF
94. Id. at 438-39.
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upon them.17
In conclusion, it seems appropriate to quote the caveat which
Savigny left for future legal scholars when he noted that the study
of law was
of its very nature exposed to a double danger; that of soaring
through theory into empty abstractions of a fancied law of nature, and that of sinking through practice into a soulless, unsatisfactory handicraft.9 8
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